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Abstract
The hypothesis of this paper is that the safety analysis pendulum has swung
considerably in the direction of increasingly complex and lengthy safety evalua-
tions and intense reviews during the past 30 years. The test of this hypothesis will
be a review of the safety analysis conducted for various activities associated with
the retrieval of transuranic radioactive waste from burial pits at a National Labo-
ratory site over a span of 30 years. The examination will focus on the safety as-
pects and the safety analysis that was conducted for the projects. At the conclu-
sion of this examination, the paper will identify five reasons why the changes have
taken place.
1. INTRODUCTION
The hypothesis of this paper is that the safety analysis pendulum has swung con-
siderably during the past 30 years. To test this hypothesis, we review the safety
analysis conducted for various activities associated with the retrieval of
transuranic radioactive waste from burial pits at a National Laboratory site.  We
evaluate these various projects with specific attention devoted to the pertinent
safety analyses.   A few words are in order on why this particular set of activities
is being examined.  One reason is that the interest in the retrieval of buried
transuranic radioactive waste is still current.  Secondly, the interest began around
1970 when the Atomic Energy Commission, the predecessor to the Department of
Energy, decided to no longer dispose of transuranic radioactive waste in shallow
land burial grounds.  Thirdly, this thirty-year period gives ample opportunity to
see what activities have been conducted and to see how the associated safety
analysis has progressed.  Of note, one drawback in trying to examine a thirty-year
period is finding the necessary documentation.  As projects are completed, and
programs are ended, as contractors and organizations change, as personnel change
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jobs and retire and as the record retention requirements change, finding the needed
information is a challenge in itself.  In some cases, it was necessary to resort to
circumstantial evidence.  And in fact, cost, schedule, and volume of paper can all
be indirect indicators of the rigor of safety analysis performed.
2. EVALUATION
Project 1. The quest starts with a 1971 project.  The Atomic Energy Commission
requested that a series of waste retrieval tests be conducted to gain insight into the
problems that may arise in a large scale exhuming operation.(1)  The results of
these tests demonstrated the feasibility of retrieving solid waste from a burial
ground and that the retrieval could be done safely.  The actual work consisted of
the movement of almost 800 barrels of waste with 16 drums retrieved and pre-
pared for hot cell examination.  The work involved the initial use of a backhoe
with the final soil and drums removed by hand.  The excavation crew consisted of
one or two laborers, an equipment operator, a health physicist and a technical man.
With respect to the safety analysis, there was a two-page analysis of five safety
considerations: fire, criticality, direct radiation hazard, inhalation radiation hazard,
and contamination spread.  This analysis generally described the hazards and the
proper steps to take to address the concerns.  The actual work in the field was con-
ducted using detailed operating procedures.  But in 1971 a detailed excavation and
transportation procedure consisted of only seven pages.  The schedule allowed two
weeks for a safety review.  The required safety equipment consisted of a radio, 4
kinds of fire extinguishers, a GM instrument for beta- gamma, a Ludlum instru-
ment for alpha, hard hats and safety glasses, anti-c clothing, full face masks, and a
portable eye wash.
Project 2. The second project began in 1974 and lasted 4 years.(2)  The purpose of
this project was to demonstrate the safe retrieval, packaging, and storage of re-
cently buried drums containing transuranic contaminated waste. A total of 20,262
drums were eventually retrieved. The retrieval operations were completed without
serious injury or spread of contamination into the environment.(3)  The working
crew consisted of an HP technician, a project foreman, an equipment operator, a
heavy equipment operator, and a laborer.
For this project we were unable to locate any specific safety analysis.  We suspect
that the success of the previous program in terms of safety contributed considera-
bly to not requiring any in-depth safety analysis.  The operating procedure de-
scription states that workers were provided with anti-contamination coveralls and
gloves, hard hats, safety shoes, shoe covers, and respirators.  “Respirators are not
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worn during routine operations, but are available as an escape device should an
airborne release occur.” The entire program spent approximately $80 per drum.
Project 3. The next project evaluated was conducted at the same time as Project 2.
This project had as its purpose to develop environmental and safety information as
well as the technology needed for retrieval of early buried transuranic contami-
nated waste.(4)  In this case, all of the waste had been underground for at least 14
years.  Due to the expected deteriorated condition of the waste containers, this is
the first time that a containment structure was proposed for contamination control.
Although we were unable to locate the original SAR; a program plan states that
“This safety analysis evaluates all known safety considerations for the project and
defines the safety measures that will be taken to preclude endangering any person-
nel during the retrieval operations.  This safety analysis was reviewed and ap-
proved by ANC and ERDA Safety departments before retrieval operations be-
gan.”(4)  The project schedule showed 9 months for  preparing and approving both
the safety analysis and the operating procedures.  The health and safety considera-
tions included fire, direct radiation hazards, contamination controls, criticality, and
toxic chemical materials.  This is also the first case in which specific training
(health physics radiation worker training, fire fighting, equipment operation, as
well as specific training for handling plutonium waste) was provided for the work-
ers.  This is also the first time that an environmental assessment was conducted.
In 1976, this assessment consisted of three pages with only one devoted to the
probable environmental effects.
There is some insight into how an Unreviewed Safety Question was addressed at
that time.  The first two drums retrieved were badly deteriorated and breached to
the point that they fell apart upon retrieval.  Markings on these two drums and the
next six drums retrieved read “Cluster Fragmentation Bomb.”  The safety division
was notified and retrieval operations were discontinued until a course of action
and special handling procedures could be developed to handle the drums.(5) Ap-
proved procedures for handling the drums labeled “Cluster Fragmentation Bomb”
were received, reviewed, and implemented two months after the initial discovery.
Project 4. The next project occurred in 1978 and involved the penetration and re-
moval of transuranic radioactive drums from a buried waste storage area.  The
project determined the condition of the drums and whether the drums would meet
the 20-year storage criteria.(6)  This project removed 102 drums.
Once again no specific safety analysis was found.  The removal of the drums was
conducted in the open air.  A safety barrier was erected with safety instruction
signs located around the excavation sites.  A barrier also bound the penetration ar-
eas with signs bearing health physics entrance requirements. Personnel exposure
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during the penetration was negligible.
Around this same time the level and degree of safety analysis began to increase
dramatically.  A study entitled “Environmental and Other Evaluations of Alterna-
tives for Long-Term Management of Buried Transuranic Waste”(7) considered both
exposures during normal operations as well as during accidents to not only the
worker but also to the maximum individual and to the population.  This study con-
sidered a wide variety of accident scenarios including volcanoes, earthquakes,
flooding, tornadoes, fires, criticality, aircraft crash and inadvertent intrusion.  The
study addressed both acute and chronic impacts.
In May of 1989, the first use of probabilistic risk assessment techniques for the
evaluation of the excavation and retrieval of buried transuranic waste was con-
ducted.  This effort was limited to those required by a Level 1 PRA; i.e., to deter-
mine the existence of risk, not the magnitude or consequences.(8)  The analysis was
further limited in that there was only a conceptual design for the retrieval.  The
work helped to identify improvements to the conceptual design to minimize risk
and to determine where unnecessary precautions had been incorporated.
Project 5. The next project evaluated took place in 1989 and penetrated, in-
spected, and removed buried waste drums from an aboveground storage pad.  As
with many of the previous projects, the purpose was to gather information to sup-
port additional buried waste retrieval efforts.  The waste removed for this project
had been interred for at least 10 and less than 20 years.
In this case a stand-alone safety assessment document and health and safety plan
was prepared.(9)  The requirements of these documents were implemented by a set
of operational safety requirements.  The safety assessment evaluated five hazards
in detail.  These were criticality, chemical, explosion, fire, and radiological.   The
safety assessment was over 120 pages long and established the safety basis for the
operation.  For the next ten years, no actual fieldwork was attempted.  However,
many studies continued, each becoming more and more analytically robust.
Project 6. The Comprehensive Demonstration Project was developed in 1992 to
retrieve, treat, and store the buried transuranic waste.  The preliminary safety
analysis report (PSAR) was scheduled to be complete by January 1993 with full-
scale production scheduled to start February 1994.   In January of 1995, the PSAR
was still in the review process.  The safety basis documented in the PSAR was
never approved.  A similar set of hazards were identified as in past retrieval and
penetration projects.  The hazards were criticality, natural phenomena, fires, and
explosions.  After many engineering analyses, documented safety analyses, and
construction of multi-million dollar structures, the subcontract was cancelled.  The
risk evaluated and the level of rigor imposed on the safety analysis never met
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contractual requirements.
Project 7. In 1997, a staged interim action project was initiated for the buried
waste area discussed in Project 6.   The project was to remediate the buried waste
areas and evaluate remedial options for other similar buried waste areas.  The ap-
proach was to execute work in three stages.  The purpose of the first stage was to
explore the subsurface to obtain data from a portion of buried waste area before
the second phase, a limited excavation and retrieval to a depth of 6m. The last
stage would remove the remaining buried waste.  The first stage had two distinct
activities:  (1) installation of probes and downhole geophysical logging, and
(2) coring, sample retrieval and analysis, and bench scale treatability studies.  Two
separate safety analyses were prepared.  Additionally, the entire first stage was in-
dependently evaluated by an independent technical review panel.(10)   The probing
and downhole logging safety analysis was extensive considering that no retrieval
was planned.  The hazards evaluated were criticality, explosion, and fire. A hydro-
gen pressurized buried drum was evaluated for the frequency of a puncture from a
probe and its consequences (even though previous projects indicated drum corro-
sion).  After two years of extensive analyses and reviews, probing into the buried
waste was authorized.  The coring preliminary safety analysis(11) was in develop-
ment for approximately two years before being placed on hold due to risk, com-
plexity, cost and extended schedule.  The analysis was extensive and complex.
The results of the safety analysis drove the estimated cost of the drill string enclo-
sure significantly over budget.  It was decided that coring was too costly and not
worth the risk.  The Stage II preliminary safety analysis(12) was in development for
less than one year.  Although no formal approval was granted for the preliminary
analysis, the DOE concurred with the analysis documents.  The project as well as
the third stage has been shelved until other remedial technologies are evaluated.
3. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It is clear from the examination of these similar projects spanning a period of al-
most thirty years that the safety analysis pendulum has swung considerably in the
direction of increasingly complex and lengthy safety evaluations and intense re-
views. Reasons for this change in safety analysis rigor are many.  The first reason
is that the requirements and expectations for safety analysis have become more
demanding.  The second reason is that safety analysis process and the tools avail-
able to conduct such analysis have evolved and become much more robust.  An-
other reason is that there is a greater understanding of the hazards involved.  Yet
another reason is that while the activity (retrieval of buried waste) has not
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changed, the task has become more difficult due to things like container degrada-
tion.  Lastly, there is greater scrutiny of these activities and these scrutinizers are
less tolerant of any mishaps.
Since even the early projects with minimal safety analysis were conducted safely
and without any significant incidents, it is difficult to determine just where the
value added of the additional safety analysis begins and ends.  Most analysts today
would agree the analyses conducted in the early years was minimal and certainly
below today’s standards.  It is not clear just what agreement, if any, would be
reached on the latest breadth and depth of analysis being conducted for today’s
retrieval activities.  Since this determination involves value judgments in addition
to technical rationale, the authors will leave it to the readers to form any conclu-
sions they wish on whether the safety analysis pendulum has swung too far.
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